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other hand, it is the American farmer who has given the city consumer the best food bargains of any country in the world.

Over the past 10 years, the percentage of disposable income that a consumer must spend for food has gone down from 25 percent first to 20 percent then to 18 percent and now down to about 17 percent of that disposable income.

Mr. Speaker, I thought this would be a most appropriate day, since we have today considered farm legislation, to drop into the hopper, what I prefer to call the rural revitalization bill.

I have no illusions that hearings on this bill will be either commenced or completed or that there will be much hope for action to during the remainder of this session. I do hope the introduction of the bill will call attention to, and may emphasize some, of the things we hope to achieve by this bill or a similar bill that may hopefully be enacted in the next Congress.

It is encouraging to know there have been hearings on similar measures over in the other body of the Congress.

The main thrust of my bill is to attempt to stop this out-migration from the rural areas to the great cities, or our urban areas.

I will not take time tonight to fully discuss all aspects of rural-urban imbalance, except to point out that less than one-third of our Nation's population lives on 99 percent of that land that constitutes rural America. This imbalance has been, and is becoming, greater each year.

If that trend is to be reversed, and if the present problems of the cities are not to become more unmanageable, something must be done. I believe we must take note of the fact there is a point of diminishing returns in terms of the management of large cities. We have reached the point that we no longer have cities, but rather megalopolises, where one can hardly determine where the city limits of one end, and the next city commences.

All of our urban problems are aggravated by the constant migration from the rural areas, or the countryside, to the cities.

The gist, or the heart of my measure, is to offer another investment incentive, over and above other investment incentives we have heretofore enacted in this body, to provide for an additional 7-percent incentive to attract industry to the rural areas or to the smaller towns of America.

A while back we passed a housing measure which, for the first time, had some provisions that were of real benefit to the rural areas. Remember, if we can get the needed housing, and if we can get better educational facilities, and if we can get good recreational facilities in the rural areas this will enable plant management to be willing to come to the countryside to live. Adding the 7 percent tax investment incentive I believe we can be on the way to attracting industry to the rural areas and arresting this migration from the rural areas to the cities, or even reversing this trend.

Mr. Speaker, I suggest that what we are really doing here is making an effort

to solve the problems of the cities in the countryside. I am firmly convinced there is just not enough money in the world, even if we started all the printing presses, to solve the problems of the ghettos so long as this migration from the rural areas to the cities continues. The reason is that even if we clean up one ghetto there will be a new one added by the increased population coming from the rural areas. The only sensible alternative is to solve the problem of the cities in the countryside and in America by inducing the population of our farms and small towns to remain in rural America.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I am happy to yield to my friend from Iowa.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I have listened with avid interest to the remarks made by the gentleman from Missouri. I am a neighbor of his. I attended school in Missouri, and I have a great feeling for that State.

Mr. RANDALL. I might add, the gentleman came back to Missouri not long ago to deliver a commencement address in my home city of Independence. It was well received. The gentleman was well accepted.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I thank the gentleman. I enjoyed being there. I had the pleasure of meeting many of the gentleman's friends, and to speak well of him and the work he is doing.

I am especially interested in this subject for two reasons. I, too, am a farm boy, from the farm country, a neighbor to the north. I know that we on the farms have lived with a very severe problem through the years. We have seen the migration to the cities.

I recall going back to my hometown in Sheffield, Iowa. That town once was a town of a little more than 2,000 and now is a town of around 1,200.

The farm population has dwindled there because of the improvement of technology and the brilliance of the farmers in taking advantage of technology so that they can produce this food the gentleman referred to, which is given to the American people, in such volume.

I think the gentleman did not mention quality. The quality of food which we produce now surpasses that of any nation in the world. Yet somehow this farm population has never had its share of our national income. So I share the gentleman's concern. I am thrilled with his announcement of this new idea or new bill which has for its purpose holding those people in those communities.

There are all kinds of industries, as you and I know, which could be operated in communities like my hometown of Sheffield or any of the hundreds of towns you could name in Missouri which could not only add to the prosperity of those farmers but in a very real sense stabilize our economy, because in many instances they can produce a product cheaper and better than it can be in many of the larger cities.

So, Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the gentleman both for his interest and his positive contributions to a real solution to the farm problem. I join him and hope the Congress will give serious con-

sideration to some of the observations he is now making.

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman from Iowa. I appreciate what he has said. I know that he speaks with all the sincerity in his heart. Missouri and Iowa are neighbors. Except for highway signs, one would not know whether he was in north Missouri or southern Iowa. Both States have rich farmlands.

I have studied the problems of our declining rural sections. In the course of my studies I have found 10 major Federal statutes under which assistance is available for preserving or rebuilding rural America and equipping its people for making their ways in new kinds of endeavors but within the healthy, uncrowded environments to which they are accustomed. In addition, there are scores of other Government programs under which help can be had for improvements in narrow, specific areas. But before any of these programs can be brought into service of any consequence, the communities they would help must first have the benefit of one or more solid sources of general support for the area, such as the industrial and commercial facilities my bill would encourage. Once this support is established, these communities can move on to projects to improve their housing, install water and sewer systems, upgrade their educational facilities, convert their lands to non-agricultural purposes, and many other pursuits for making the transition from unprofitable farming to prosperous communities of other kinds.

We must find some way to stop a further decline of the economies of our good rural sections where agricultural endeavor no longer offers a profitable way of life. We must stop this further waste of our human and natural resources because of the changes that have been taking place in rural America. We must find some way to stop the outflow of the rural population to these crowded urban areas. I think we must find some way to supply new hope and prosperity all across the countryside of this great country of ours. I am hopeful my own rural revitalization bill and others like it will provide that hope and the relief for rural America which it needs so very much. While helping rural America it will alleviate the problems of urban America by encouraging many city dwellers to reverse the trend of migration and to return to the land from which they fled.

U.S. STOCKPILE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, on July 11 at page 20780 of this RECORD I placed the text of a letter dated July 1 I had written to the Secretary of Defense expressing some concerns relative to the U.S. stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons. Today I have obtained permission that the Secretary's reply to me under date of July 11 and my response to his reply dated July 29 also appear as a matter of record. The two letters are reproduced below.

It seems to me that a meaningful dialog on this general subject is in the defense interests of the United States and I invite comment on this series of letters both from my colleagues and the public.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., July 11, 1968.

HON. CRAIG HOSMER,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOSMER: Thank you for your letter of July 1, 1968, expressing your concern about our tactical nuclear weapon capability.

As you know, the AEC and DoD continually exchange information on weapon requirements and laboratory weapon research and development. On a formal annual basis, we furnish the AEC our Nuclear Weapon Development Guidance and receive from the AEC their Weapon Development Status Report. Informally, we are in continuing touch with the AEC to receive information on the latest laboratory progress and to inform them of changes in our weapon needs. When it appears that development of new nuclear warhead systems may be desirable, we study the possibilities jointly with the AEC. In fact, such studies in the tactical nuclear weapon area are almost always in progress. Thus we feel that we are well informed of AEC developments as they occur and that the AEC is well aware of our requirements.

The decision as to whether a particular new system should be produced or not is a complex matter, involving such considerations as capabilities of existing systems, projected effectiveness of the new system, cost of the new system, expected threat, available production facilities, and whether there is a role for the new system in our defense posture. We believe that we have balanced these various considerations properly over the past few years to build a flexible tactical nuclear force. Our present force covers a wide range of warhead yields and delivery capabilities, and we believe that it is adequate now to fulfill its missions. Of course, as I pointed out above, our requirements and development possibilities are under continual review, and we stand ready to improve our force as the need arises.

In short, I am unable to identify any new weapon possibilities which we have erroneously rejected. Your letter is not very specific on this point, perhaps because of security considerations. If this is the case, a classified exchange on specifics might assist in allaying your doubts about our tactical nuclear capability.

I assure you that I share your view that we should have an effective, flexible, tactical nuclear weapon capability. I believe that our present force provides that capability.

Sincerely,

CLARK CLIFFORD.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., July 29, 1968.

HON. CLARK M. CLIFFORD,
Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your July 11th response to my July 1st letter concerning tactical nuclear weapons development. I am pleased that you share my view that the United States should have an effective, flexible tactical nuclear capability.

However, the generalities of your response do not ease my concern that we are failing to take advantage of our technological capabilities in this particular weapons area.

Your letter stressed the completeness of systems analyses efforts for yielding answers on the basis of cost-effectiveness comparisons. And, while I recognize that there are regular formal and informal exchanges of development guidance between DoD and the

AEC, and that there are frequent joint feasibility studies on weapons possibilities, the payoff is in the decision to produce, not the decision to study or analyze.

As pointed out in my letter, grave doubts can be expressed regarding the political credibility of our current tactical stockpile. There is not a single weapon in it for which a decision to produce was made after 1960. I am also not aware of any weapon system in the tactical nuclear area which has a possibility of being turned over to the military forces before 1972. Because of this it is easy to understand why the average yield of our tactical stockpile has taken on the horrendous proportions described by Mr. McNamara and why DoD studies on tactical nuclear war in Western Europe show such terrible devastation possibilities to the people and lands of our NATO allies.

Since I am aware of what the AEC weapons laboratories have a potentiality to develop in the area of smaller, cleaner and more discriminate tactical nuclear systems to alleviate such devastation, and am aware of the daily increasing obsolescence of our present capability, I can only assume that the absence of an effective force modernization is a matter of conscious and deliberate decision within your office based on outputs of your systems analysts' cost-effective formulas.

It is obvious that the principal costs with which such studies were concerned must have been dollar expenditures. What seems to have been neglected are the enormous costs in lives and properties of our allies which employment of an obsolescent stockpile would involve. Of course, costs of this nature cannot be avoided cheaply, but surely avoiding them must, in the end, be far less costly than risking them. The narrow base of the studies you refer to seem to have excluded many non-dollar costs and considerations. It would seem that they fail to consider or to assign a value to the political cost of losing the confidence and goodwill of our NATO and Asian allies consequent from our reluctance to update our tactical nuclear posture.

I have the uneasy feeling that the studies also fail to consider or assign a value to the stockpile degradation factor. Certainly the threat for which the tactical stockpile first was conceived is not diminishing, but our existing systems cannot help but degrade in relation to it with the passage of time. The dollar cost of providing new systems to allay this degradation must, of course, be reckoned with in such studies. But the non-dollar cost and ineffectiveness of not providing them also must be reckoned with.

I recognize the complex nature of the decision process at the DoD Secretariat level and the validity of the many inputs you described. It seems, however, that in some cases its outputs still are inadequate. I have in mind such things as the case of the TFX, the question surrounding our advanced nuclear submarine program, the turn-around of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier decision, and our persistent inability in Vietnam to bomb small targets with precision. What I fear is that the output in the tactical nuclear weapons case may be similar, despite your statement that you are "unable to identify any new weapon possibilities which we erroneously rejected." The statement concedes that new developments of possible high promise which the AEC laboratories have offered over the last half-dozen years have, in fact, been rejected and I seriously question whether or not the rejections consistently were made without error.

What I find most interesting is that if the past DoD policy of refusing to modernize the tactical nuclear capability continues for only a few years more, the United States will have returned by evolutionary stages to essentially the doctrine of massive retaliation, but without the will and resolve which made that doctrine successful in earlier days of our nuclear history.

In an age when our potential enemies have an impressive and growing tactical nuclear capability we need a similar force which realistically meshes with the requirement, both military and political, to fight a tactical nuclear war, which capability also goes far toward deterring such a war. Conversely, the lack thereof may encourage it. And should it come, our inability to respond in a manner less than strategic, i.e., by way of massive retaliation, seems like national suicide.

I find it reassuring that you state we now have a flexible tactical nuclear force with a wide range of warhead and delivery capabilities. But what of the future? I ask only that you look ahead to five years from now and see whether the same will hold true then. For more than five years the Soviets have had to test underground because of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. As a consequence there is no possible way to monitor the nature of their progress toward refining their tactical nuclear stockpile. So one must be most leery of an assertion that the expected threat is well understood. If you will look ahead objectively, in light of the cold hard fact that almost no new United States capabilities are forthcoming, you may become apprehensive about the matter as I have.

If, indeed the Soviets have been busy perfecting a family of clean, discriminate tactical nuclear weapons and the time should ever come when they decide to use them against us and our allies, a time will come when the devastation and contamination from tactical nuclear war will come from our stockpile. Or, a time will come when, because of the inevitability of such devastation and contamination, the Soviet appetite for Free World territory will have to be appeased. Moreover, even the possibility of such asymmetry in capabilities is unlikely to keep an already infirm NATO alliance from further weakening.

Also, of course, as we look toward the future, there are changes to be anticipated and new threats to be faced from other aggressors and in other parts of the world, particularly should the Nonproliferation Treaty fall in whole or in part and there is no real assurance that it will not do so. Forward thinking and analysis of our future tactical nuclear weapons stockpile cannot neglect these considerations, either.

As a Member of Congress who must stand for re-election each two years, I am fully aware of the political pitfalls of openly discussing matters concerning nuclear weapons. Certainly the introduction of this subject into the 1964 Presidential campaign brought out this political peril most clearly. It may well be that in today's political climate the subject is equally perilous.

However, there is another element of today's climate which was not present in 1964 and which makes such discussion timely even at personal political risk. It is that the United States' capability to honor its many commitments through the employment of conventional force alone is far less optimistically assessable than it was in 1964.

The realistic test to which these forces have been put in Vietnam during the interim since 1964 has had quite disappointing results. Even though we far outnumber the enemy and have huge technological superiority, including a virtual mastery of the air over Vietnam, and even though we have run up an enormous cost in lives, money and resources to carry on operations there, an increasing number of high level comment is heard that military victory is not achievable.

As a result it is becoming evident that there is a developing opinion in the nation that a major reshaping of United States policy on defense commitments may be in order, in the nature of a drastic pullback. This, if it comes, will involve unilateral abrogation of many longstanding commitments to many Free World nations who will

be turned loose to fend for themselves. Its consequence to the United States position and power in the world would be difficult to define in cheerful terms.

I would be most troubled, and I know you also would be, if a drastic shift of this nature took place without public scrutiny and judgment on the feasibility of less radical alternatives, which to my mind include at least a look at bolstering what now appears to be an inadequate United States conventional capability via the truly discriminate tactical nuclear route. In this sense I would feel much better if a healthy public appraisal of our tactical nuclear weapons posture and potentialities were to be made.

This is particularly true since many, including myself, have an uneasy feeling that nowhere in the complex DoD structure is there an office, agency or person who is primarily concerned not just with study, but also with initiatives regarding the overall tactical nuclear problem.

You were very kind to offer to conduct a classified exchange with me on various specifics of this general subject and I appreciate it. However, I believe this is something that should be discussed not just with me, but with the membership of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which, by law, has certain responsibilities in the matter. For this reason I am sending a copy of this letter to the Committee with the recommendation that suitable hearings be scheduled either with you this year or early next year with your successor.

I think it would be valuable for the Committee in a general way to go into the various questions raised in our correspondence to date and specifically, of course, into such questions as:

- (1) What tactical nuclear weapons have been approved for development?
- (2) The status of the development progress of those weapons.
- (3) What tactical nuclear weapons are now in the joint feasibility study phase?
- (4) Which of these DoD considers have a role in our defense posture and have, thus, a high probability of approval for production?
- (5) What tactical nuclear weapons which have been in the feasibility study phase or development since 1964 were disapproved for production and the reasons for such disapproval.

I feel that such a hearing could be quite helpful toward an understanding of the manner in which your office intends to continue having an effective, flexible, tactical nuclear weapons capability.

Sincerely,

CRAIG HOSMER,
Member of Congress.

AS THE IRON HORSE HEADS FOR PASTURE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROBISON] is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, Life magazine this week is running a pictorial salute to the fast-disappearing passenger train and, on its editorial page, carried the following comment about this one more in our bulging portfolio of national problems—but one that may well have solved itself before Congress gets around to thinking about doing anything about it:

AS THE IRON HORSE HEADS FOR PASTURE

At the rate the great long-distance trains are disappearing, scenes such as those on pp. 36D-50 may soon qualify as nostalgic memorabilia of a vanished age—like stereopticon views of horse-drawn trolleys. In

the past 10 years, 858 intercity trains have disappeared, among them such reverberating names as the 20th Century Limited, the Lark and the Chief.

Oddly enough, the people now most eager to do away with the great trains are the railroad operators themselves. They say that they are losing a half billion dollars a year carrying passengers in a country where everybody wants to fly or drive his own car. Some experts argue that the loss is nowhere near that great, but everybody agrees that the railroads lose money on passengers. This being a free-enterprise country, the railroads say that if the demand is not capable of supporting the expense, they should be free to eliminate the service.

That may be simple marketplace economics, but there is nothing simple about the economics of transportation. The money that the consumer spends on tickets or tolls is only part of it. Think of the billions spent on superhighways and interchanges and those gasoline taxes that—unlike most taxes—can only be spent on roads. Think of the millions that must now be spent (and not just by air travelers) to improve airports to relieve the crowded air. The railroads, too, in the early days especially, had a preferred position at the public trough. But now they are less eager to be subsidized, because they don't want to incur the public obligations that go with it. They want to be free to make money on freight alone. Commuter trains, perhaps with public funds, they might accept—but long-distance trains, no. It may be that the real interest of the country would dictate that some form of railroad passenger business coast to coast should be supported at the expense of a few interchanges or airport runways. We'll never know as long as we have no national transport policy.

Optimists thought we might get one with the creation of the new Department of Transportation, but its powers were seriously constricted in the very legislation that gave it birth. Now a cry for national transport priorities has come from a most unlikely source. The normally somnolent Interstate Commerce Commission, which regulates the railroads, has petitioned Congress to study the future of railroad passengers.

Usually one more elaborate study of a problem is just what we don't need. But a study of the country's everyday transportation needs might just make good sense. The ICC has also asked Congress, at least for the duration of its own study, to give it power to deny the urge of the railroads to derail the last of their great trains. That makes sense, too. By the time we find we need those trains, there may be none left to save.

Mr. Speaker, the reason why this problem may—a I said a moment ago—have solved itself before we get around to trying to do so, is set forth in the final sentence of Life's editorial:

By the time we find we need (these) trains, there may be none left to save.

For the sad truth of the matter is that railroad passenger service in this highly advanced Nation of ours is in danger of extinction.

The Interstate Commerce Commission—the Federal agency that, willy-nilly, has presided over the recently accelerating rate of passenger train disappearance—had this to say about this problem back in 1958, well before matters had reached their present stage of urgency:

For more than a century, the railroad passenger coach has occupied an interesting and useful place in American life, but at the present time the inescapable fact—and certainly to many people an unpleasant one—

seems to be that in a decade or so this time-honored vehicle may take its place in the transportation museums along with the stage and the steam locomotive.

The ICC's prediction of a decade ago was more than accurate. I am informed that as of the first of this year only 38 railroads, out of a total of about 760 both large and small lines, still operate passenger service—and those that do, as many of us know to our regret, are doing their best to rid themselves of even that vestige of what I believe must still, somehow, be preserved as an integral part of our national system of transportation.

I do not intend, Mr. Speaker, in these remarks to point the finger of blame at anyone—for, truth to tell the would-be passenger is just as much to blame as is railroad management for such facts as that, in 1967, for class I railroads, only 20 passenger train cars were purchased while the same roads were buying new freight cars, or rebuilding old ones, to a total number of about 99,000 and, in addition, bought or reconditioned some 1,100 diesel electric locomotives.

But what are we going to do about it?

Here we are, at the present moment, fussing along with our constituents who have been writing in to us to complain about it, over the current massive aerial traffic jam that is so bad, and threatens to get so worse, that neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor, so far as I can discover, anyone in Congress has any real idea what to do about it.

Well, look at it this way: Although the normal flight time between New York and Washington is something under an hour, air travelers still have to figure on about 2 hours to get from center city to center city, and when—as is now happening—we get aircraft after aircraft stacked up over airports or waiting for runway clearance, then the elapsed travel time for the harried and impatient traveler begins to approach the time that the faster trains between these two cities used to take—back when there were such trains.

Surely, Mr. Speaker, we can do better than this—as a Congress and as a nation—and I, for one, find it more than passing strange that the cry for national transport priorities that has finally come arrived, as Life notes, from a “most unlikely source”—the Interstate Commerce Commission, itself.

It was an “unlikely source” precisely because—as those of us well know who have done what we could to try to save railway passenger service through our districts—the ICC has not, in the past, protected the overriding public interest in the continuance of at least a base railway passenger service as zealously as it might have.

However, when the ICC proposed, in its recent report to Congress, that a Federal study of national transportation requirements should be made to determine what, if any, passenger train service was needed to meet future demand and of methods for developing a modern rail network, if such a system was desirable, it took a constructive—if overdue—attitude to which this Congress should make a like response.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to commend